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Executive summary 
More skills, higher levels of skills, and different kinds of skills have to be developed and 
effectively organised if countries are to be able to enhance their industrial competitiveness 
and, as a result, improve their governance systems and the functioning of their institutions. 
Despite several efforts to invest in the skills development sector in Tanzania over the last 
decade, the sector has remained weak and presents a number of critical challenges for the 
country. First, Tanzania needs to integrate and create employment for large groups of young 
people every year, many of whom come from the poorest segments of society. Second, the 
quality and type of skills developed in Tanzania do not meet the requirements of productive 
organisations, while at the same time there are very few firms capable of organising and 
deploying skills effectively. The third major challenge that Tanzania faces relates to the 
financing and governance of the skills development sector. 
In many countries in Southern and Eastern Africa, governments have relied on dedicated 
levies to finance the skills development sector (the Skills Development Levy (SDL) in 
Tanzania). The governance of these schemes is made particularly difficult by the fact that 
private organisations hardly see the results of their financial contribution on the ground. In 
some cases, this is because skills development takes time and is sector-specific, in other 
cases it is because firms themselves do not develop the organisational capabilities needed 
for them to be able to benefit from the improved skills. As a result – and despite the fact 
that both governments and companies have a strong joint interest in developing skills – 
more often the sector is affected by conflicting dynamics and allegations of resource 
misallocations and tax avoidance.  
In Tanzania, vocational education and training (VET) activities and services are run by around 
520 providers and promoted under more than thirty programmes and public–private 
partnership (PPP) schemes (e.g. Integrated Mining Technical Training (IMTT) in the mining 
sector). The existing VET centres are extremely heterogenous with respect to their capacity 
and training quality, but also with respect to the proportion of long and short courses they 
are able to provide. VET providers include public VET centres, some of which are owned by 
the VET Authority (VETA). The latter are funded through the SDL, which is set at 4.5% of 
firms’ monthly payroll. The SDL in Tanzania is significantly higher than in Kenya and South 
Africa and there are worries that this can create a competitive disadvantage and discourage 
formal employment. Moreover, business organisations and associations have lamented the 
fact that the levy is not used entirely for VET programmes, and that accountability of the 
financing and allocation model needs improvements. 
In order to ensure more constructive engagement between the public and private sector, 
the transparency and accountability of the fund flows seem to be an important preliminary 
condition. This implies: (i) a gradual move away from a centralised system where the SDL is 
used to fund general government expenditures; (ii) a less ambiguous legal framework which 
allows tracking of SDL collection and allocation; (iii) a more direct link between sectoral-level 
collection and allocation, while guaranteeing that cross-sectoral needs are met; (iv) 
increased voice and accountability in the curriculum and determination of whether existing 
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training models are fit for purpose. Reform opportunities also exist in terms of restructuring 
incentives to take into account differences across sectors and firm types, as well as different 
governance levels. Another important area for reform relates to the design and delivery of 
skills training itself. There is a significant need for greater differentiation between skills 
training to meet the needs of current employers, and skills training to enable trainees to 
establish new economic activities (i.e. self-employment). Finally, promoting the involvement 
of the private sector in on-the-job training through industrial placements, dual 
apprenticeships and internships is critical to improve the overall supply of quality VET and a 
skilled workforce. The introduction of rebate or grant models such as those adopted in South 
Africa and Kenya could potentially improve the link between VETA and VET providers and 
private companies. 
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1. Introduction 
The industrial competitiveness of countries depends on many factors; ‘ultimately perhaps 
the most important single determinant is the level and improvement of workforce skills at all 
levels’ (Lall, 1999: 2). More skills, higher levels of skills and different kinds of skills have to be 
developed and effectively organised if countries are to be able to enhance their industrial 
competitiveness and, as a result, improve their governance systems and the functioning of 
their institutions. Indeed, all countries that have experienced sustained economic growth 
and structural transformation have targeted and significantly invested in the development of 
their skills sector.  
The importance of skills development as a driver of structural transformation becomes 
evident when we look at companies’ technological efforts at the shop-floor level. For firms, 
the possibility of capturing new production opportunities in markets and introducing new 
production technologies – machines, equipment and tools, or selecting alternative 
technologies – critically depends on the domestic availability of relevant industrial skills and 
their effective organisation and deployment in production and innovation (Penrose, 1959; 
Lall, 2001; Toner, 2011; Andreoni, 2014).  
Firms rely on workforce skills for absorbing and adapting technologies to local conditions, 
and to innovate and ultimately increase productivity. Organisational capabilities are the 
collective and managerial capacities that companies need to develop to make effective use 
of workers’ improved skills. Organisational capabilities are also crucially important for the 
development of new modes of production, from the simple re-arrangement of production 
tasks up to the introduction of information technologies for process control, inventory 
systems and quality management (Penrose, 1959; Amsden, 1989; Andreoni and Chang, 
2017; Khan, 2017).  
From a country-level perspective, the importance of skills for technological development is 
just as clear as at the shop-floor level. Crucially, increasing skills changes the structural 
trajectories of countries: they move from simple to difficult technologies, and within them, 
from basic production functions (for simple components and assembly) to complex ones (for 
improvement, design and innovation). Engaging in more complex production activities 
generally leads to the creation and eventual capture of higher value, increased productivity 
and generates spillover benefits to local input-supplying companies, within and across 
industries (Chang, 2002; Cimoli et al., 2009; Andreoni, 2019, forthcoming). 
In fact, the improvement of workforce skills is a core driver of structural transformation as 
well as one of its main outcomes. Specifically, the development of organisational capabilities 
and the expansion of technological processes within domestic and foreign companies create 
new demand for higher-skilled workers as well as generating resources to improve the 
education and vocational school system. Governments, in partnership with companies, have 
a fundamental role to play here. By investing increasing tax revenues in the education 
system and, in particular, in the vocational education and training (VET) system, they can 
help drive the cumulative self-reinforcing process of skills development and structural 
Skilling Tanzania: improving financing, governance and outputs of the skills development sector 
9 
transformation (Noman et al., 2012; World Bank, 2012). Various forms of in-job training and 
re-skilling are integral to the VET system as they allow for experience-based technical skills 
development as well as for the transformation of formal education-based skills into 
production capabilities.  
This working paper provides an in-depth analysis of the financing and governance of skills 
development in Tanzania, to inform the development of new strategies and, ultimately, to 
improve sectoral outcomes. While the sector presents several governance and 
accountability challenges, the paper aims to identify potential areas for improvement in the 
financing, design and delivery of VETs. The findings of the study have informed the design of 
an Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) discrete choice experiment that outlines different 
packages of incentives which might be used to re-align interests in the sector and to design 
new strategies that take account of company differences. 
The feasibility of new strategies depends on policy-makers and practitioners having an in-
depth understanding of the different organisations and institutions involved in the sector, as 
well as the flow of resources from collection to deployment and how these set up a specific 
type of incentive structure. Therefore, after providing background information on the 
composition of industry and skill sets in Tanzania (section 2) and introducing the VET system 
(section 3), the paper presents new quantitative evidence and rent analyses of the Skills 
Development Levy (SDL)-based VET model in Tanzania (sections 4 and 5). The paper 
concludes by outlining a number of potential areas for strategic intervention (section 6). 
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2. Background: industry and skill sets 
in Tanzania 
2.1. Industry structure 
The Tanzanian industrial sector is mainly composed of small establishments, accounting for 
97.3% of a total of 49,243 establishments. There are only 1,322 large establishments with 
more than 10 employees, of which 998 operate in the manufacturing sector. Disaggregated 
analysis of 2013 firm census data for Tanzania (Andreoni, 2017b) reveals the high structural 
heterogeneity of the country’s industrial sector, in particular the extreme differences in 
industrial performance and capabilities across types of establishment. Tanzania’s production 
system represents a dualist structure, with a high concentration of industrial activities in a 
few industries (e.g. mining and quarrying, manufacturing, manufacturing of food products) 
and regions (e.g. Morogoro and Dar es Salam), and a limited number of large- and major-
scale establishments. A vast group of micro- and small-scale firms remain largely excluded 
from value-added processes, scaling-up opportunities and market access. Indeed, 80% of 
manufacturing value addition (MVA) is generated by just 200 establishments employing at 
least 100 employees, and the same group of companies accounts for 87% of the total value 
exported. The limited number of medium-sized enterprises prevents any rebalancing of this 
dualist structure.  
Figure 1: Structural heterogeneity in manufacturing in Tanzania (2013) 
 
 
Source: Andreoni (2017a) 
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2.2. Skill levels and employment rates 
In 2016 the total population of Tanzania was 51.1 million with an estimated working age 
population of around 23.8 million (ILO KILM, 2016). The employment to population ratio in 
Tanzania was 76% in 2016, slightly higher than the Eastern Africa ratio at 74%. On average, 
across age groups, men are more actively engaged than women in the labour market (81% 
against 71%). Young women between 15 and 24 years old are least engaged in the labour 
market in Tanzania, at only 55%. A majority of people in employment are concentrated in 
the agriculture sector (currently 67%, but 81% in 2001) followed by the service sector (27%, 
with more than half in hotel and restaurants) and the industry sector (6.4%). Figure 2 shows 
how the country’s total employment rate has been on a decreasing trajectory between 2007 
and 2013. Since then it has followed the Eastern Africa average rate. 
According to the LO/FTF Council Report 2016, based on ILO data, around 850,000 young 
people enter the country’s job market annually, but only 50,000 to 60,000 formal-sector jobs 
are created each year. With more than 66% of the population under age 25, this job 
shortage poses a critical challenge to the economy and broader society. Moreover, given the 
limited absorption capacity of the formal sector, underemployment and informal-sector 
employment have been on a rising trend. Almost one out of five (22%) of the working-age 
population and 35% of the youth population (15-24 years old) are inactive in the labour 
market (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Labour force employment and inactivity trends 2007-2016 
     
Source: LO/FTF Council (2016) 
In 2012 a report by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (MITI and 
UNIDO, 2012) showed a dominance of low-skilled employees (53%) across small, medium 
and large firms in Tanzania (Figure 3). Firms with an international market orientation had the 
highest skilled workforce, with low-skilled workers at 40%, medium-skilled at 31% and high-
skilled at 28%. Extractive companies registered the highest proportion of medium-skilled 
workers.  
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Figure 3: Workforce skill levels by type of firm (2012) 
 
Source: Andreoni in MITI and UNIDO (2012) 
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ratio goes from 0.3 to 0.4 and 0.5, progressing, respectively, from small to medium and 
finally to large establishments. The positive correlation between increased establishment 
size and increased presence of operative skilled workers (in particular, in the progression 
from medium to large establishments) is particularly strong in the manufacture of clothing, 
pharmaceutical products, repair and installation of machinery and equipment and other 
transport equipment. By contrast, the ratio of unskilled operatives is consistently higher 
among small and medium establishments and decreases for large ones (from 0.8 to 0.3 for 
mining and quarrying, and from 0.7 to 0.5 for manufacturing). 
According to the LO/FTF Council Report 2016, based on ILO data, in Tanzania the skills 
mismatch between labour supply and demand by educational attainment reached 28% in 
2013 (with a noteworthy gap between men at 21% and women at 32%).  However, the skills 
mismatch between job requirements and qualifications was significantly higher and reached 
40% in terms of incidence of under-education and 14% of over-education.  
The most recent World Bank Economic Survey (2017) suggests that English and information 
technology (IT) skills are the two specific types of skills that are lacking according to 
employer assessments (Figure 4). Another type of skill set that has been widely reported as 
lacking among the workforce in Tanzania is work ethics and loyalty to employers. Such ‘soft 
skills’ have been identified in several interviews with the Association of Tanzania Employers 
(ATE) and other private-sector organisations. Further investigations have revealed that 
companies complain about lack of loyalty, especially with respect to the fact that workers 
may leave a company for a better salary in another company/competitor. Companies feel 
that they are thus not able to extract any value from any investments they make in terms of 
VET for workers.  
Figure 4: Type of skills needed in Tanzania (2017)  
 
Source: World Bank Economic Survey (2017) 
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At lower skill levels lack of work ethics is also mentioned, but with reference to basic skills 
and reliability of workers. Amongst this group, poor working conditions and salaries often 
mean that even when workers have formal employment, they also often undertake several 
other informal activities which implies that workers are not always reliable or fully 
committed.  
Among small and medium enterprises with limited foreign market exposure, references to 
’soft skills’ are often made because employers themselves lack the organisational 
capabilities to assess the specific types of skills that are required to reach certain products 
and raise quality standards. This is one of the reasons why the World Bank Economic Survey 
(2017) results do not appear to point to a skills crisis in Tanzania – on the contrary, in key 
areas such as problem-solving and job-specific skills, a majority of firms reported that their 
workers reach the required skill levels.  
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3. Tanzania’s vocational education 
and training (VET) sector: activities, 
outputs and emerging models 
Despite several efforts to invest in the skills development sector in Tanzania over the last 
decade, the sector has remained weak and presents a number of critical challenges for the 
country (Tanzania Planning Commission, 2014; see Hong et al., 2016 for an analysis of the 
impact of skills challenges on firms’ productivity).  
First, as in other Southern and Eastern African countries, Tanzania needs to integrate and 
create employment for large groups of young people every year, many of whom come from 
the poorest segments of society. In this respect, VET schemes attempt to achieve a twofold 
mandate of inclusiveness and skills development for productive organisations. While these 
goals can go hand in hand, the limited financial resources may lead to trade-offs and impact 
on the overall quality of VET. For example, VET programmes are affected by poor quality 
primary education and the overall adverse environment in which young people operate. 
The second challenge relates to the fact that the quality and type of skills developed in 
Tanzania do not meet the requirements of productive organisations, while at the same time 
there are very few firms capable of organising and deploying skills effectively. The existence 
of skills gaps and mismatches has been widely documented in several developing countries 
(Gereffi et al., 2011; ADEA, 2012; Ansu and Tan, 2012; Adams et al., 2013; AfDB and BMGF, 
2015; Fox and Kaul, 2017). Less emphasis has been given to the fact that a lack of 
competitive productive organisations can hamper the development of experience-based 
technical skills, which is particularly the case in Tanzania, given its small productive sector 
and the productivity challenges that the country faces (Andreoni, 2017b; Cti, 2018). 
The third challenge that Tanzania faces relates to the financing and governance of the skills 
development sector. Countries around the world have designed and deployed different 
funding mechanisms for financing VET (for a review see Ziderman, 2016). In many countries in 
Southern and Eastern Africa (including Tanzania, Kenya and South Africa), governments have 
relied on dedicated levies to finance the skills development sector. The governance of these 
schemes is made particularly difficult by the fact that private organisations hardly see the 
results of their financial contribution on the ground. In some cases, this is because skills 
development takes time and is sector-specific, in other cases it is because firms themselves do 
not develop the organisational capabilities needed for them to be able to benefit from the 
improved skills (see Higuchi et al., 2017 for an experiment on the impacts of management 
training in Tanzania). As a result – and despite the fact that both governments and companies 
have a strong joint interest in developing skills – more often the sector is affected by 
conflicting dynamics and allegations of resource misallocations and tax avoidance. This is 
particularly the case in Tanzania, as demonstrated by the continuous conflicting claims around 
the Skills Development Levy (SDL) over the last decade (ATE, 2011; interviews in 2018 with Cti, 
the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) and the CEO Roundtable). 
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3.1. Activities, capacity and outputs 
In Tanzania, VET activities and services are run by around 520 providers and promoted under 
more than 30 programmes operated by international organisations and partners (e.g. the 
Employment and Skills for Eastern Africa programme (E4D) and Skills for Oil and Gas Africa 
(SOGA)). VET providers include public VET centres (some owned by the VET Authority 
(VETA), others by the central and local government), private VET centres, civil society 
organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), faith-based organisations 
(FBOs) and private companies in the industrial sector.  
VETA is both a provider of VET activities/services with its own 28 VET centres across all 
regions of the mainland of Tanzania, as well as the regulatory body for the entire skills 
sector. The National Council for Technical Education (NACTE) is the authority responsible for 
regulating technical education in Tanzania,1 but unlike VETA, it does not provide any 
technical education and training activities/services directly. 
VET activities in Tanzania can be clustered into five main groups. The first four schemes are 
formalised under VETA, while the final scheme is less formal and is work-based. 
(a) Institutional-based VET activities: 
VET activities are conducted in a VETA-owned VET centre or a registered, privately owned 
VET centre. VET centres are supposed to be endowed with all the necessary facilities to 
provide training, including classrooms and workshops fitted with basic practical training 
equipment/machinery. The duration of VET is determined by the content of the curriculum 
and ranges between one and three years for ‘long courses’ (LCs) and from three to nine 
months for ‘short courses’ (SCs). During the training, trainees are scheduled to undergo 
practical training sessions (‘field attachment’) in an industry for a period ranging between 
four and eight weeks for the whole duration of long course training. Graduates receive a 
formal certification from VETA following completion of their training. 
(b) Skills Enhancement Programme (SEP): 
The SEP scheme is meant to update and/or upgrade the skills of existing employees with a 
view to upskilling individuals in the face of technical change. VETA collaborates with private 
companies in identifying skills needs/gaps and designs the curriculum. VETA also delivers 
trainings using both internal instructors or experts and those from other institutions or 
companies. The cost of the training is equally shared between the company and VETA 
(although contributions from VETA are often in the form of curriculum design). Graduates 
receive formal certification from VETA. 
 
1
 NACTE was formed in 1997 as an autonomous public agency under the Ministry of Education (NACTE Act No. 9, 1997; 
Amended in 2012).  
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(c) Dual Apprenticeship Training (DAT, pilot phase run by VETA): 
DAT is an LC scheme (running 52 weeks per year for three years) which involves both VET 
centres and specific industries providing structured training on an alternate basis (according 
to a ‘block release system’ model). The industry is supposed to provide well-trained 
supervisors who oversee on-the-job training, while VET centres are expected to complement 
this training with theory and additional hands-on training. Currently, the DAT scheme is in a 
pilot phase in VETA and covers the three sub-sectors of hospitality, electrical and motor-
vehicle mechanics. It is under the sponsorship of the German government through the 
Hamburg Chamber of Skilled Craft. 
(d) Integrated Training for Entrepreneurship Promotion (INTEP): 
INTEP is an employment-oriented VET scheme focusing on unemployed people or people 
working in the informal sector (micro/small enterprises) in both rural and urban areas. It 
aims to improve employability and self-employment. 
(e) Informal apprenticeships:2 
In addition to the DAT scheme, there is also informal apprenticeship training where training 
is work-based and there is no structured curriculum. Supervisors have experience in their 
activities, but have limited pedagogical knowledge. No formal certification is issued to 
graduates, however the majority of apprentices become employed/absorbed within the 
organisation or enterprise where they have been trained. Such apprenticeships are common 
practice in both the informal sector and in some industries. 
The number of VETA-owned and private VET centres has fluctuated dramatically over the 
last ten years and, with that, the overall VET enrolment capacity has varied too (see Table 1). 
In 2009 there were 672 VET centres in Tanzania (of which 21 were VETA-owned), which 
increased to over 1,000 in 2010. As a result of revisions to the licenses granted to private 
VET providers, the total number of VET centres went down to 750 in 2011. Since then, the 
total number of centres (especially privately owned ones) has increased up to 2015 to reach 
almost 900 centres. In the following two years (2016-17), the numbers have started to 
decline again and have stabilised at around 550 VET centres in total, 28 of which are VETA-
owned (VETA data and interviews).  
Since 2000, the growing number of students enrolled in VET programmes has been driven by 
the substantive increase in the number of students completing primary and lower secondary 
education. In fact, most entrants to VET programmes are Form 4 graduates rather than 
primary school leavers (B.E.S.T. various years, VET Data Handbook). According to VETA 
(2018) (See Table 1), the total number of enrolled students in VET programmes has doubled 
 
2
 VETA also piloted a Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) scheme to promote apprenticeship in the informal sector by 
undertaking assessment and recognition of skills acquired informally at a workplace. Informal apprentices’ skills are 
assessed, and targeted programmes are provided to fill the gaps towards examination and certification. During the pilot 
period, 570 apprentices were identified, 487 were evaluated and 400 passed their examinations and received certification 
(VETA, 2018). 
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from 2007 to 2015, reaching around 196,000 students in 2015 (together, SEP and INTEP 
accounted for around 17,000 enrolled students in 2015). Almost one third of total enrolled 
students are trained in public VET centres, including those owned by VETA. In 2015, VETA 
reported that the average yearly drop-out rate was 8% over 2007-2015.  
Table 1: Number of VET centres and enrolment rates in Tanzania (2007-2015) 
Year Number of centres Enrolment Total  
enrolment 
Public Private Total 
Public (incl. VETA) Private 
M F Total M F Total M F Total 
2007          49153 46613 95766 
2008          36152 29646 65798 
2009          40304 32634 72938 
2010          52666 52154 104840 
2011 109 641 750       64,449 56849 121348 
2012 173 586 759 21811 15173 36984 63436 45091 108527 85247 60264 145511 
2013 179 670 849 37986 12022 50008 54849 49496 104345 102559 61518 164077 
2014 189 705 894 44573 14650 59223 64573 65891 130464 109146 80541 189687 
2015 189 709 898 55595 15349 70944 65147 60000 125147 120742 75349 196091 
Average 165 588 753 33309 12336 45646 54217 52110 106326 89147 64446 153592 
Source: VETA (2018) 
Note: Enrolment includes both LCs and SCs. 
According to VETA (2018), in 2015 the VET centres in Tanzania had a total enrolment 
capacity of around 190,000 students (see Table 2). More than half of students were enrolled 
in VET programmes offered by privately owned centres (57,268) and VETA-owned centres 
(54,000) combined. While the total number of enrolled students (196,091) was slightly 
above the total VET capacity, utilisation capacity varied greatly among the different types of 
VET institutions. VETA-owned centres operated significantly above their capacity at 126%, 
alongside private VET centres (129%), CSOs (128%) and local government centres (120%). In 
contrast, central government and FBOs were operating far below their capacity (42% and 
78% respectively). According to VETA internal audits (personal interview), when 
underutilisation was reported, this was due to lack of machineries, tools and materials. 
The existing VET centres are extremely heterogenous with respect to their capacity and 
training quality, but also with respect to the proportion of LCs and SCs they are able to 
provide. Overall, 64% of reported VET capacity is for SCs rather than LCs. The former are not 
only shorter in time, but also tend to have different offerings in terms of accommodation 
and access to facilities. 
In 2015 the Government of Tanzania set ambitious targets for the end of the Five-Year 
Development Plan (FYDP 2020/21) of 700,000 VET graduates by 2020/21 (and one million by 
2025/26), and an expected proportion of the working population with mid-level skills of 
33.7% (and high-level skills of 12.1%). According to VETA (Table 2 and personal interviews) 
the achievement of these ambitious goals will require a significant scaling up in the capacity 
of existing VET centres in the country. 
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Table 2: Centre capacity and enrolment by centre ownership (2015) 
Ownership of VET 
institution 
CAPACITY ENROLMENT % 
Enrolment 
in VET 
% Capacity 
utilisation 
Capacity 
(LCs) 
Capacity 
(SCs) 
Total 
capacity Male Female Total 
Central government 11,507 16,806 28,313 8,279 3,565 11,844 6% 42% 
CSO 4,264 3,127 7,391 5,217 4,218 9,435 5% 128% 
FBO 16,387 9,074 25,461 11,078 8,876 19,954 10% 78% 
Local government 2,419 1,122 3,541 2,497 1,754 4,251 2% 120% 
Private company 9,192 20,544 29,736 19,222 19,268 38,490 20% 129% 
Private individual 14,547 37,631 52,178 29,630 27,638 57,268 29% 110% 
VETA 10,463 32,982 43,445 44,819 10,030 54,849 28% 126% 
Grand total 68,779 121,286 190,065 120,742 75,349 196,091 100% 103% 
Percent 36% 64% 100% 64% 40% 103%   
Source: VETA (2018) 
Note: Percentage capacity utilisation is the ratio of enrolment against capacity of VET institution. 
VETA conducts labour market surveys every year and tracer studies every five years to make 
sure that the skills provided as part of VET training address existing and future demand from 
employers. The VETA tracer study conducted in 2010 involving 18- to 29-year-olds suggested 
that as many as 66% of VET graduates were employed (Table 3) (VETA, 2010). Agriculture 
and food processing, construction, and clothing and textiles emerged as the sectors with the 
highest employment rates (above 90%). In terms of employment type, 43% of the employed 
VET graduates had paid employment in 2010, 50% were self-employed and 7% were 
employed without renumeration. These results confirm the twin goals of VET in Tanzania of 
skills development and inclusiveness, as well as the limited absorption capacity in the formal 
private sector (Moshi, 2014). 
Table 3: Employability of VET trainees and reasons for unemployment/inactivity (2010) 
 Gender  Employment type 
Employment status Male Female Total Self-employed Paid employment Employed without pay 
Employed 67.4% 63.5% 66.1% 50% 43% 7% 
Unemployed 
 
 
 
 
 
22.1% 27.4% 23.9% 
 
Reasons for unemployment or 
inactivity 
Male Female Total 
No demand for the trained skill 
area/trade/course 
19.2% 13.7% 15.8% 
Not receiving expected 
salary/wages 
5.4% 2.7% 4.3% 
Lack of resources to start self-
employment and confidence 
22.3% 32.1% 26.3% 
Health reasons 0.5% 2.7% 1.4% 
Attending training to fill 
gaps/upgrading 
47.5% 33.6% 41.8% 
Housework 2.5% 11.8% 6.3% 
Other external factors, including 
seasonality 
2.6% 3.3% 2.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Inactive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.5% 9.1% 10.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Author based on VETA (2010) 
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The proportion of VET graduates who reported being unemployed or inactive in 2010 was 
23.9% and 10% respectively. Unemployment rates were notably higher among female 
graduates than males and reached 27.4%. If we exclude the students who were still 
attending training to fill skills gaps at the time of the tracer study (41.8%, of which 47.5% 
males and 33.6% females), the two key reasons for unemployment/inactivity of VET 
graduates were: lack of resources to start a business (26.3%) and no demand for the trained 
skills (15.8%). Women seem to possess trained skills that are in relatively higher demand 
than men (13.7% of females’ skills weren’t in demand compared to 19.2% of males’ skills). 
Given that male enrolment in VET programmes is higher overall (see Table 1 and 2), this 
proportion of men reporting no demand for their skills is highly problematic. 
3.2. Emerging VET models: private- and public-led 
partnerships 
Over the last decade there have been several public–private partnership (PPP) initiatives in 
Tanzania to promote skills development and bridge the gap between public providers and 
industry. The first private-led PPPs have been implemented across the three VETA centres in 
Moshi (Integrated Mining Technical Training – IMTT project), Lindi and Mtwara (Enhancing 
Employability through Vocational Training– EEVT project), and Mtwara (Petrobras 
programme). The IMTT project is the oldest and perhaps the most established initiative. 
More recently, the government has also launched two new DAT and National Internship 
schemes to be promoted by the Ministry of Labour under a new public-led PPP.  
Private-led PPPs: the Moshi Centre 
IMTT started in 2009 under the lead of the Tanzanian Chamber of Minerals and Energy 
(TCME) in partnership with its members – African Barrick Gold and Anglo Gold Ashanti 
initially, later joined by another six sponsors3 – and the VETA Moshi campus. A 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between TCME and VETA to guide the 
project through the different phases of planning and implementation through to monitoring, 
evaluation and sustainability. TCME member companies made US$2.4 million available 
towards project implementation with a focus on: a) converting/refurbishing some of the 
existing VETA facilities; b) building a completely new training workshop and several 
classrooms; c) retooling/upgrading of the existing welding, electrical and motor vehicle 
mechanic workshops; d) training of trainees (six sent to South Africa to upgrade their skills 
by attending three-month tailormade ‘Train the Trainer’ programmes); e) exposing trainers 
to higher training standards by undergoing staff development at mines; f) recruiting a 
project manager from an overseas partner organisation to oversee implementation of the 
programme; and g) guaranteed maintenance of equipment by TCME. 
The IMTT initiative started in response to the shortage of skills required by the highly 
technical mining operations in Tanzania and the increasing salaries that qualified miners were 
 
3
 These are: Sandvik Mining, Kabanga Nickel, Pan African Mining Services, Shanta Mining, Mantra Resources (Uranium One) 
and Atlas Copco. 
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managing to secure with the opening up of new mines. The programme provides a three-year 
training course for students who have successfully passed lower secondary school as a 
minimum. After a generic four-month skills course in the use of hand and measuring tools, 
basic machine and drawing, students start on a continuous rotation between theoretical, 
practical and on-the-job training, which continues until they qualify at the end of the third 
year. Successful students receive a NACTE level four certificate at the end of the course in 
their area of specialisation. Five areas are offered: electrical, fitting/fitter mechanics, 
welding/plater welding, diesel mechanics/heavy moving equipment, and auto electrical.  
TCME manages implementation of the programme and student scholarships. Companies 
provide scholarships of US$1,500 for each student, of which US$600 is transferred to VETA 
Moshi to cover full board and a small salary. The remaining resources are retained by TCME 
to maintain and upgrade training equipment, to train trainers and to provide training 
incentives. For 2013, the Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) reported estimated costs of 
US$2,500 per student for the IMTT three-year programme, which targets four occupations. 
Annual enrolments were reported at 100 students per year (300 at any one time across the 
three-year course), with 90% (140) of graduates in employment with sponsor companies as 
at July 2013. Since then, the programme has increased its student enrolment numbers to 
200 annually, and many graduates are in high demand in other sectors as well (IMTT, 2017). 
Alongside these outcomes, the IMTT has reached a high level of efficiency by combining 
targeted investment with a radical reform of its curriculum to deliver a huge increase in 
capacity within its existing infrastructure. In 2013, the programme occupied 20% of the 
physical footprint of the VETA Moshi Centre, and employed approximately 20% of its 
teachers, but trained at least half of the total students on the site (VSO, 2014). 
Several factors have contributed to the success of the IMTT initiative, including pre-
assessment students; the quality of trainers; efficient use of facilities, tools and rotational 
system; and on-the-job experience provided by the various companies with high operational 
and technical standards and organisational capabilities. The latter is perhaps the most 
important factor and suggests the need to rethink the curriculum offered by VET centres for 
LCs. The IMTT initiative demonstrates that even for medium-/high-level technical skills, 
three years of mainly theoretical education is too much and ineffective, while more practical 
training and industry exposure can increase trainees’ readiness and employability (ibid.). The 
shortening of courses could also increase VETA capacity and potentially increase the number 
of enrolled students. 
3.2.1. Public-led PPPs: national apprenticeships and internship programmes 
Over the last two years, the Prime Minister’s Office for Labour, Youth, Employment and 
Persons with Disability has been assigned a share of the SDL to pilot two new national 
apprenticeship and internship programmes. These pilots are supposed to be part of a five-
year skills development programme organised around three main activities: 
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(a) National apprenticeship (guidelines published in September 2017) 
 A scheme for the tourist industry already involves 200 employees and consists of 40% 
formal training and 60% training in hotels 
(b) National internship (guidelines published in September 2017) 
 Only for graduates 
 Interns receive a monthly salary of 300,000 Tanzanian Shillings (TShs): the money is 
transferred directly to a personal bank account that they have to open when they begin 
the scheme. Companies hosting interns sometimes top up this amount.  
 The Ministry of Labour approached the Association of Tanzanian Employers (ATE) and 
the TPSF to identify possible companies willing to host interns but they found significant 
resistance and diffidence (companies fear this is a way to add new taxes/levies and are 
concerned about facing additional costs in hosting interns). 
(c) Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) (no guidelines produced so far) 
 The Ministry of Labour agreed with some private companies about the possibility of 
obtaining a rebate if they want to invest in upskilling some of their worker.  
The Skills Development Programme is run by a Steering Committee including: ATE, the Trade 
Union Congress of Tanzania, TPSF, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry, the 
Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC), VETA and NACTE. The Department of 
Employment hosts the programme and has a small Skills Development Unit of three people 
to run the programme (at least during the two-year pilot phase, after which the programme 
will be evaluated at the end of 2018). The Tanzania Employment Services Agency (TAESA) is 
expected to implement some of these new programmes after the pilot phase.  The first 
pilots have focused on the leather sector and hotels in Arusha. 
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4. The Skills Development Levy (SDL): 
financing and governance of the skills 
sector 
4.1. SDL regulatory framework and its recent development  
The SDL is a levy collected by the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) under the VET Act and 
Income Tax Act to promote skills development in Tanzania.4  
According to the VET Act (Revised edition 2006; Section 14, Act No. 14 of 2001), ‘the SDL is 
charged based on the gross pay of all payments made by the employer to the employees 
employed by such employer in the particular time. Where in any case an employer pays 
emoluments to any employee at intervals of less than a month or at intervals of greater than 
a month, such payments shall apply as if such employee was entitled to monthly payments 
and the monthly chargeable emoluments of such employee in respect of any month shall be 
deemed to be the chargeable emoluments that would have accrued to the employee had 
the emoluments been payable monthly. The gross emoluments is the sum of amount from 
salaries, wages, payments in lieu of leave, fees, commissions, bonuses, gratuity, any 
subsistence travelling, entertainment or other allowance received by employee in respect of 
employment or service rendered.’ 
Since the fiscal year 2016-17 (Finance Act 2016, Part XVI), the SDL rate has been charged at 
4.5% of the total emoluments paid to all employees during the month. An ‘employee’ is 
considered to be permanent employees, part-time employees, secondary employees and 
casual laborers, etc. The SDL has to be deducted for the purpose of ascertaining the taxable 
income in accordance with the Income Tax Act (section 11). 
The SDL must be paid by any employer who employs four or more individuals on or before 
the seventh day of the month following the month of payroll. The employer must calculate 
the levy and pay this amount to the Commissioner’s account according to the tax region in 
which the employer is registered.5 The employer is also expected to prepare and remit half-
year certificates which tally with the monthly returns submitted during that period. 
  
 
4
 In the 1995 VET Act the SDL was named the VET Levy. The levy was renamed the SDL in Act No.14 of 2001. 
5
 SDL payments should be made using form ITX 300.01.E - Employment Taxes Payment Credit Slip. 
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The SDL does not apply for the following institutions (see below references to exemptions 
introduced in the Finance Acts 2014 and 2015):6 
(a) government departments or public institutions that are wholly financed by the 
government 
(b)  diplomatic missions 
(c)  the United Nations (UN) and its organisations 
(d)  international and other foreign institutions dealing with aid or technical assistance 
(e)  religious institutions whose employees are solely employed to (i) administer places of 
worship; or (ii) give religious instructions or generally to administer religion 
(f)  charitable organisations7 
(g)  local government authority 
(h)  farm employers 
(i)  registered educational institutions (private schools including nurseries, primary and 
secondary schools; VET schools; universities and higher learning institutions). 
In response to significant lobbying from private companies and employers (see ATE Report, 
2011), the Government of Tanzania has revised the SDL financing model. Some of these 
changes were also triggered by the fact that other countries such as Kenya apply SDL at only 
2% (see the Kenya case study in section 5.1). The changes mainly relate to the SDL rate, 
while a number of provisions and exemptions are recognised in the regulatory framework. 
In 2013, under the second Kikwete Presidency, the Finance Act amended sections 14 and 19 
of the VET Act and reduced the SDL rate from 6% to 5%. Moreover, the SDL exemption 
provision guaranteed to ‘any Government department and to any public institution which is 
non-profit making and wholly financed by the Government’ was amended to include ‘any 
Government department or public institution which is wholly finance by the Government’. 
This first revision of SDL exemptions was followed by two other revisions in the following 
two years. First, in 2014, the Finance Act extended the exemption from the SDL to 
diplomatic missions, the UN and other international organisations, religious institutions, 
charitable organisations and local government authority. Second, in 2015, the Finance Act 
extended the exemption from the SDL to ‘farm employers whose employees are directly and 
solely engaged in farming’ and made clear that this exemption ‘shall not include employees 
who are engaged in the management of the farm or processing of farming products’. 
Despite these reductions in the SDL rate and exemptions, between 2014 and 2015 the 
Ministry of Labour introduced an Employee Compensation Fund, with contributions of 1% 
from employers which effectively cancelled out the reduction in the SDL rate. Since this 
 
6
 Zanzibar is exempt from a-d and g.  
7
 Defined as ‘a resident entity of a public character registered as such and performs is functions solely for: (a) the relief of 
poverty or distress of public; (b) provision of education or public health; and the Commissioner General is, upon due 
diligence making, satisfied that the business conducted by such entity is for public good.’ 
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time, public-sector employers in Tanzania have been required to contribute 0.5% to the 
Fund while the private sector has been required to contribute 1%. This Employee 
Compensation Fund levy applies to all employers and employees in Tanzania and employees 
who ordinarily work outside Tanzania but who have been stationed in mainland Tanzania for 
more than 12 months. Contributions for the Fund are determined on a calendar monthly 
basis. 
In 2016, the newly elected government approved a further reduction of the SDL rate from 
5% to 4.5%, while the SDL base and exemptions remained unchanged (Finance Act 2016). In 
the following year, however, the Finance Act 2017 introduced a new SDL exemption for the 
registered education institutions listed in (i) above. In the 2017 Task Force for Tax Reform 
Meeting, the Confederation of Tanzania Industries (Cti) proposed to reduce the SDL rate 
further still to 4%, while ATE proposed to reduce it to 3.5%, closer to the Kenyan levy. The 
government response was negative, and it was reported that a reduction of 0.5% would 
have an impact of 30 billion TShs (personal interview with Cti and ATE). 
4.2. SDL revenue and allocation: a quantitative assessment 
According to the tax collection statistics provided by the TRA,8 the average total SDL 
collected between 2010 and 2017 amounted to 191,490 million TShs per year, while for the 
first two quarters (2Q) of 2017-18 it already amounted to142,418 million TShs suggesting a 
significant upward trend. Since 2010, the amount collected as SDL has been growing at a 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 12.87%, registering significant peaks in 2014-15 
(22% annual growth) and 2015-16 (17% annual growth). The SDL is reported under two main 
departments: the Domestic Revenue Department (Direct Tax) and the Large Taxpayers 
Department (Direct Tax). The latter was introduced in 2001 and includes around 475 
companies with a threshold of 400 million TShs in revenue. 9 
Figure 5 shows the total SDL revenue between fiscal years 2010-11 and 2017-18 (2Q), as well 
as the annual growth registered in SDL collections. As previously discussed, the SDL went 
through various revisions during this period, both with respect to the levy rate (decreasing) 
and base (different employer exemptions). The figure also shows the SDL contributed by 
small and medium employers (reported under domestic revenue direct tax) and that paid by 
large employers (reported under large taxpayers direct tax). As discussed in section 2, given 
the skewed industrial structure of the Tanzanian economy, large taxpayers contributed 66% 
of all SDL collected in 2010. 
  
 
8
 The data is available quarterly from 1997-98 to 2017-18 (2Q). The analysis in this section can be expanded for 20 years. 
9
 See http://allafrica.com/stories/201801030440.html 
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Figure 5: Total SDL revenue (2010-2017/18 (2Q), million TShs) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on TRA tax collection statistics 
It should be noted that the contribution of small and medium enterprises and large 
taxpayers has been rebalancing since 2010, however. As shown in Figure 6, the share of SDL 
paid by large taxpayers out of the total SDL collected has decreased from 66% in 2010-11 
through to 2012-13, to 58% in 2016/17 and 53% in 2017-18 (2Q). As previously discussed, 
these changes in contribution shares among different types of employers might relate to 
multiple factors including changes in the SDL rate and base, and points to an expansion of 
the overall SDL tax base since 2015-16. 
Figure 6: Shares of SDL contribution by employer type (2010-2017/18 (2Q), million TShs) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on TRA tax collection statistics 
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The SDL is a significant levy across tax departments in Tanzania (Table 4). SDL accounts for 
4% of the total domestic revenue from direct tax (excluding large taxpayers) and the 
collected amounts have remained pretty stable throughout the period under review. If we 
consider the total tax burden for large taxpayers, thus including excise duty local, value 
added tax local and direct taxes, on average since 2010 the SDL accounts for almost 3% 
(2.93%) of the total tax burden. Finally, the total SDL collected across small, medium and 
large taxpayer/employers accounts for 3.26% of total domestic revenue. 
Table 4: The significance of SDL across tax departments (million TShs) 
  SDL rate 6% 6% 6% 5% 5% 5% 4.5% 4.5% 
  DEPARTMENT 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 (2Q) 
   TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 
A Domestic revenue (gross) 996997 1225532 1440219 1759997 1940862 2428096 2874518 1594342 
A1 SDL (domestic revenue direct tax) 41304.60 45495.68 51979 61699 81601 101821 118596 67572 
B Customs and excise (gross) 2336366 2616747 2971799 3626742 4138464 5351079 5647947 3139284 
C Large taxpayers (gross) 2131143 2826361 3619104 4491991 4585819 5441227 5679510 2980817 
C1 SDL   (large taxpayers direct tax) 78701 93405 102937 106946 134518 159907 161522 74846 
  TOTAL A+B+C (gross) 5464507 6668641 8031122 9878731 10665146 13220404 14201975 7714443 
  Total SDL (A1+C1) 120006 138901 154916 168645 216119 261729 280118 142418 
  Less: Transfers to refunds A/C & VETA 171595        
  Less: Transfers to VETA  42014       
  Less: Transfer to VETA & others   52024 8243     
  Less: Transfers to VETA & vendor  
(MV D/licence) 
    64880 9219   
  SDL (A1) / domestic revenue 4.14% 3.71% 3.61% 3.51% 4.20% 4.19% 4.13% 4.24% 
  SDL (C1) / large taxpayers 3.69% 3.30% 2.84% 2.38% 2.93% 2.94% 2.84% 2.51% 
  Total SDL / A+C 3.84% 3.43% 3.06% 2.70% 3.31% 3.33% 3.27% 3.11% 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on TRA tax collection statistics 
Note: Data on transfers to VETA have been nominated and reported discontinuously by TRA. 
The TRA Corporate Plan 2017/18-2021/22 (TRA, 2018) projects SDL collections for mainland 
Tanzania and Zanzibar (Table 5). These projections suggest an expectation by the 
government that there will be a significant and steady increase of SDL revenue of 13% 
(CAGR) to reach a peak of 616.7 billion TShs, more than double the amount collected in the 
fiscal year 2016-17. 
Table 5: SDL revenue projections for mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar  
(2017/18-2021/22, billion TShs) 
SDL revenue projections 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22 
Tanzania mainland 329.2 389.7 461.1 527.4 616.7 
Zanzibar 10.4 12.1 13.7 15.5 17.7 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on TRA (2018) 
According to the original 1995 VET Act, the SDL (named VET Levy until 2006) was collected 
directly by the TRA and allocated one third of the revenue to the VET Fund – a ringfenced 
fund for financing VETA activities. The 1995 VET Act was silent with respect to the remaining 
Skilling Tanzania: improving financing, governance and outputs of the skills development sector 
28 
two thirds of the levy. The revised VET Act 2006 incorporated Act No.14 of 2001 whereby 
the levy was renamed the SDL and new provisions were introduced with respect to 
collection and allocation, as well as overall resources of the VET Fund.10  
According to the revised Act, ‘the SLD may be paid directly to the Commissioner or by such 
other agency as the Minister may after consultations with the Minister responsible for 
finance appoint’. The Commissioner is expected to submit two thirds of the amount 
collected to the Treasury, and one third to the VET Fund.11 Although prior to 2013 the Act 
failed to specify where the remaining two thirds should be allocated, several government 
sources reported that this portion was allocated to the Higher Education Students Loan 
Board (HESLB). This legislative vacuum was later addressed in 2013. 
In 2013 the Miscellaneous Laws Amendment Act No. 3 amended the Education Fund Act 
2001 and linked the SDL to the Education Fund managed by the Tanzania Education 
Authority (TEA). The Education Fund was established in 2001 as a basket fund for 
‘improvement of access, equity and quality of education’. With the 2013 Laws Amendment, 
resources allocated to the Education Fund are (emphasis added): 
(a) ‘such sums not less than two per centum (2%) of the annual Government recurrent 
budget less than the amount payable in defraying the national debt as additional funding 
to educational levels’ 
(b) ‘skills and development levy as provided for under the Vocational and Education and 
Training Act’ 
(c) ‘such sums as may be appropriated to the Fund by the Parliament’; and 
(d) ‘such sums as may be accrued to the Authority by way of loans repayment, interests, 
grants, projects or donations from any source within or outside the United Republic.’ 
Moreover, the following ‘formula for allocation of funds’ under the Education Fund was 
introduced: HESLB (64%); TEA (30%); NACTE (3%); Tanzania Commission for Universities 
(TCU) (3%). Given that the VET Act was not amended, the Laws Amendment seems to make 
reference to the remaining two thirds of the SDL but it does not explicitly say if it should all 
be allocated to the Education Fund. The resources that HESLB receives are therefore coming 
directly from the Education Fund, of which a certain non-specified amount is covered by the 
SDL. 
Despite these allocative rules having not changed formally since 2013, interviews with 
several stakeholders – including the Prime Minister’s Office for Labour, Youth, Employment 
and Persons with Disability and the TPSF – reported two important changes in the SDL 
allocations and the allocation process (and the related VETA budgeting process). 
 
10
 The VET Fund includes the following resources: a) all assets owned by the National Vocational Training Division; b) such 
sums as may be paid as one third of the SDL; c) such sums as may be provided by Parliament; d) such sums as may be paid 
to VETA by way of grants or donations from any source within or outside Tanzania. 
11
 ‘The Minister for Finance may after consultation with the Minister make regulations relating to the collection and 
distribution of the levy under the VET Act’ (revised VET Act 2006). 
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According to our interviews, during the Tanzania National Business Council in 2015 it was 
reported that total SDL revenue for the fiscal year amounted to around 120 billion TShs and 
that the government would have started allocating the funds according to the following 
formula: one third to VETA (as for the VETA Act), one third to HESLB (to support zero interest 
rate loans for students in specific subjects) and one third to the Prime Minister’s Office for 
Labour, Youth, Employment and Persons with Disability (to finance a two-year pilot of a new 
skills development programme focusing on national apprenticeship and internships – see 
section 3.2). The resource allocation figures provided were of roughly 40 billion TShs for 
VETA and HESLB respectively, and 15 billion TShs for the pilot skills development programme 
(although half of this was returned to the Treasury given lack of capacity for 
implementation).   
Figure 7 illustrates SDL allocation from 2010 to 2017. It should be noted that the figures 
reported by the different stakeholders do not always match those reported by the National 
Budget and Auditor General Report. This is due to the fact that the two main agencies to 
which the SDL is allocated do not know the exact amount collected and are provided with 
SDL figures indirectly through the Ministry of Finance. In the case of the HESLB, despite the 
fact that the total allocation is far above 350 billion TShs per year, the board was able to 
report that between 60-70 billion TShs were resources coming from the remaining two 
thirds of the SDL. The lack of clarity in SDL allocation has recently increased with changes to 
the allocation and budgeting process and government commitments taken in the TNBC that 
were not formalised. 
The SDL allocation and budgeting process has changed with respect to VETA in two 
significant ways. First, according to the VETA Act, one third of the SDL is supposed to go 
straight from the TRA to the VETA Fund. Since 2013, however, when the allocation process 
changed, all of the SDL revenue is directly transferred from TRA to the Treasury, which is 
then expected to allocate funds to the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, which 
in turn transfers the resources to VETA, based on the agreed annual budget.12  
Second, as for the budgeting process, the VETA budget is constructed ‘bottom-up’, from 
individual teachers to each department within a VETA centre and then VETA centres. It is 
then reviewed and approved under each VETA zone, and finally consolidated and approved 
by VETA Head Office (see more on accountability under section 4.3 that follows). While this 
process is still in place, since 2016 the Ministry of Finance has started applying a budget 
ceiling of 53 billion TShs on the VETA budgets and providing projections for the construction 
of the five-year VETA corporate plan.13 
  
 
12
 Under the previous regime, VETA managed the VET Fund and was able to gain short-term interest by depositing funds 
with reputable banks. The interest was used to support recurrent development activities or simply for smoothing the 
availability of funds, especially when the monthly transfer from TRA was lower than expected.  
13
 Even if VETA asks for more resources, it ends up receiving the same amount (and again it is not clear if this corresponds 
to the full third of SDL, partially because VETA does not know the total SDL revenue collected from TRA and also because 
resources are now transferred through the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Education). 
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Figure 7: SDL allocation (2010-2017, million TShs) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on several sources: TRA tax collection data; National Budget 2017/18; Auditor General Report 2018; 
own interviews with HESLB and Prime Minister’s Office for Labour, Youth, Employment and Persons with Disability. 
4.3. SDL governance and accountability 
Given that one third of SDL revenue is supposed to be allocated to VETA and that private 
VET centres can receive indirect SDL contributions only through VETA, the SDL accountability 
system relies mainly on the VETA governance and accountability structure, especially with 
respect to internal budgeting and allocation to VET activities. As for the remaining two thirds 
of SDL revenue, the Treasury is the only institution accountable for SDL allocation to the 
Education Fund (and in particular the HESLB).14  
VETA is an autonomous government authority under the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology since 2006 (before it was under the Ministry of Labour) and carries overall 
responsibility for the VET sector. VETA performs its ‘double function’ – as regulatory 
authority and VET provider – through a VETA Head Office located in Dar es Salaam and nine 
Regional/Zonal Boards and an office governing and managing the nine zones.15 All VETA-
owned and privately owned VET centres are clustered under one of these regions/zones and 
responds directly to their Regional/Zonal Board and indirectly to the National ‘VET Board’. 
Thus, VET activities are governed by different bodies at national and zone levels which are 
also in charge of budgeting approvals and accountability.  
 
14
 An analysis of the accountability and governance structure of the HESLB is beyond the scope of this paper. 
15
 Northern zone; Eastern zone; Central zone; Lake zone; Western zone; South East zone; South West zone; Dar es Salaam 
zone; and Highland zone. 
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According to the VETA Act, VETA is governed by the ‘VET Board’ which comprises eleven 
members with a Chairperson appointed by the President and ten other members appointed 
by the Minister of Education, Science and Technology as follows: a) two members to be 
nominated by the organisations representing employers; b) two members to be nominated 
by trade union movements (to represent employees); c) three members to be nominated by 
each of the ministries responsible for industry, labour and education; d) three members to 
be nominated by NGOs that manage vocational education and training institutions. The 
appointed board members are expected to hold office for three years, after which they may 
be eligible for re-appointment. The Director General is the Chief Executive of the VETA 
Authority and is directly responsible to the Board for the day-to-day administration of the 
affairs of the Authority. After consultations with the Minister, the Board appoints the 
Director General of the Authority on such terms and conditions as the Board may determine. 
Currently, VETA is managed through five main Directorates and is supported by a Chief 
Internal Auditor, one Head of Procurement (although procurement is only centralised for a 
limited number of items) and a Public Relations Manager (Figure 8).16 
Figure 8: VETA governance structure 
Source: Author based on interviews with VETA. 
16
 Section 8 of the VET Act provides for the establishment of Trade Advisory Committees. Trade Advisory Committees with 
experts from the labour market are technical arms of the Board responsible for approving training standards and 
curriculum. Twelve (12) Trade Advisory Committees have been established for the following sectors: mechanical, electrical, 
civil and building engineering, automotive, commercial and business support, clothing and textile, transport, extractive 
industry, printing, cosmetology, agriculture and food processing, hospitality, and Tourism and Travel Agencies. 
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Regional/Zonal VET Boards undertake obligations delegated by the National VET Board and 
also determine priorities for their zones. Each Zonal VET Board comprises not more than 
seven members, including representatives from key stakeholders in VET, namely, a 
chairperson to be appointed by the National VET Board; three members nominated by the 
organisations representing employers; two members to be nominated by trade union 
movements representing employees; one member to be nominated by the Regional 
Administration; and one member to be nominated by NGOs representing training 
institutions. The Regional Director is Secretary to the Regional Board.  
Zonal Boards are in charge of nine functions:  
a)  to coordinate VET activities within the region 
b) to provide direct supervision and serve as the governing board for all vocational training 
centres within the region  
c)  to provide guidelines and supervision on budget preparations by VET institutions within 
the region  
d)  to evaluate budget proposals for vocational training centres managed by the authority 
within the region and forward the budgets to the Board 
e)  to determine regional priorities for VET  
f)  to authorise vocational training centres managed by the authority within the region to 
utilise any funds raised from fees or other activities of the centres 
g)  to inspect vocational training centres according to regulations and guidelines laid down 
by the Board 
h)  to prepare annual reports to the National Board on training and related activities in the 
region 
i)  to advise the National Board on any matter related to the improvement of VET in the 
region. 
VETA produces a ‘Corporate Plan’ every five years which goes through a mid-term review 
process. As shown in Figure 9, the plans and budgets are constructed according to a bottom-
up model which is also supposed to guarantee accountability in budgeting, allocation and 
review of outcomes. 
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Figure 9: VETA budgeting and accountability process 
 
Source: Author based on interviews with VETA 
The composition of Regional and National VET Boards is mainly meant to ensure that the 
strategic interests of key stakeholders and partners in the VET system are taken into account 
through budgeting, allocation and outcome assessment processes. However, from 
interviews with private-sector stakeholders (ATE and Cti) it seems that these Boards are 
rarely used for accountability purposes, even during the revision of the budgeting process or 
outcomes assessment, and mainly focus on reforms to the curriculum.  
The Chief Internal Auditor is the only auditing process in place at the VETA Head Office level, 
and the ‘external’ auditing processes – including the General Auditor – rely on the internal 
processes and data. Thus, there is no real external auditing, beyond the internal multi-
stakeholder boards. Being located beneath the VETA Head Office, the Internal Auditor has 
limited capacity to monitor decisions taken at the zonal board levels. Some of these 
decisions – for example, the introduction of short-term courses and their rates, or the 
allocation of VETA resources to private VET providers – rely on cross-checks by the different 
stakeholders involved in these boards.  
Since 2015/16 the government has applied increasing pressure on the TRA to improve 
domestic resource mobilisation. As shown in section 4 (Table 4), across all revenue 
Skilling Tanzania: improving financing, governance and outputs of the skills development sector 
34 
departments, domestic revenue increased by 18% from 2015-16 to 2016-17, while the 
contribution from large taxpayers increased by 4%. SDL revenue increased by 16% among 
small and medium employers, and by 7% among large taxpayers/employers. If we compare 
the SDL revenue collected in 2010/11 and 2016/17, it has more than doubled.  
This increasing pressure on tax collection has gone hand in hand with: a) stronger control by 
the central government (and the Presidency, in particular) over domestic revenues 
generated by all Ministries, Departments and Authorities (MDAs); and b) a process of 
centralisation of financial resources. As discussed in Andreoni (2017a), the centralisation of 
financial resources generated at all government levels is an integral part of the 
transformation of the Tanzanian political settlement. This centralisation process manifests in 
three complementary ways.  
First, pressure from the Treasury for all domestic generated resources via direct and indirect 
taxation, duties and levies to: a) reduce potential leakages; b) increase the availability of 
central government funds and space for policy actions, in particular to fund major 
infrastructural investments; and c) reduce the amount of resources circulating in the system 
that could be captured and controlled by internal factions and clientelistic networks. This 
has been seen in many areas, for example, with respect to the reform of the agricultural 
sector’s system of levies and subsidies, especially with respect to the fertiliser scheme. 
Second, stricter control over the budgeting process of MDAs via the introduction of budget 
ceilings – as in the case of the VETA – and a stricter supervisory role for the Ministry of 
Finance to mainly reduce waste or personal resource capture. This has resulted in strict 
control over MDA spending for workshops, travelling, per diems, etc., and increased use of 
technologies to collect taxes and financial transactions (from paying taxes to fines). While 
this has allegedly reduced some of the leakages throughout the different 
allocation/budgeting processes, accountability is still weak and mainly relies on internal 
auditing processes, as seen in the case of VETA. These processes become increasingly less 
robust and vulnerable to resource capture the more the budgeting and allocation processes 
involve multiple layers of MDAs spanning the country. More critically, accountability of 
outcome and performance assessment remains pretty poor, as shown in the case of the 
VETA system. 
Finally, and perhaps more critically, the government and the President have centralised the 
rents allocation process both via ad hoc deals in a number of sectors (see Andreoni, 2017a), 
and via the formal centralisation of key functions such as the allocation of import licences. 
For example, import licences for sugar went under the control of the President in 2016, and 
private companies which were misusing these licences were found accountable and 
denounced in several key fora such as the TNBC.    
The centralisation of financial resources, budgeting and rents allocation has triggered (and in 
some cases is also a response to) the introduction of resource-generating activities across 
MDAs, especially at the local level. In the case of VETA, for example, the more traditional 
long courses have been increasingly complemented by short courses.  
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4.4. VETA self-financing through short courses 
VET centres offer various types of courses. We can distinguish between them by three main 
factors:  
(a) the skills/tasks and professional profile targeting one or more sectors 
(b) the length of the programme, spanning from one to three years for LCs and from three 
to nine months for SCs offered by both VETA-owned and private (registered) VET centres 
(a) the fee rate range, from the highly subsidised fee rates for LCs offered by VETA-owned 
centres (60,000-120,000 TShs annually for full board) to the more expensive SCs offered 
by both VETA-owned and private VET centres (fees vary considerably but can easily reach 
300,000-600,000 TShs or more).   
Short courses have proliferated in Tanzania over recent years, sometimes in response to a 
demand from the private sector, and in some cases as a result of the existing incentive 
structure (Figure 10). Drawing on the VETA Application online platform, we find that the 
portfolio of VETA-owned centres offers an average of 47% SCs, but that in some cases this 
provision can be over 60% (Arusha Vocational Training Centre) and 70% (Dar es Salaam 
Regional Vocational Training and Services Centre). Interestingly, private providers tend to 
offer more LCs (an average of 80% of portfolios are LCs).  
Figure 10: Utilisation of SDL funds by VETA to support SCs and LCs 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the VETA Application On line Platform 
However, while private VET providers charge the full economic cost (plus a profit margin) for 
their LCs, VETA centres do not make any margin on LCs and charge full costs for their SCs. 
This means that the latter offer an opportunity for internal resource generation by VETA 
centres which can be used to increase teachers’ salaries. The margin made here is partially 
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due to the fact that teachers who run SCs are using VETA infrastructure, and that extra 
training materials are charged to the trainees.  
Although some SCs have been developed to better meet demand from employers and to 
make full use of the spare capacity of VETA centres, in some cases incentives might have 
induced an oversupply of SCs (for which trainees or employers pay a relative high fee) 
against LCs (which employers already pay for via the SDL). The opportunities for income 
generation may have also incentivised some teachers to move to VETA centres (e.g. in Dar es 
Salaam). 
In 2013 VETA introduced Guidelines for Income Generating Activities (GIGA), in an attempt 
to regulate these income-generating activities – for SCs in particular – and to address 
potential distortions in the system. Despite this important step, accountability of these 
income-generating activities remains opaque. In interviews, the VETA Department of 
Finance and Chief Internal Auditor were not able to provide information on the number of 
SCs offered by VETA centres. This means that at the central level there is no capacity to 
assess if the income share they receive from VETA centres for IGA is correct or if resources 
are captured at the VETA or Zonal Board levels. Given the number of SCs offered and the 
relatively high fees, IGA income can be relatively high – according to the VETA statement of 
income and expenditure for 2012/13, IGA income reported at the central level was as high 
as 13 billion TShs, which is almost one third of the SDL transferred to VETA (VETA, 2014). 
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5. Rent analysis of the SDL-based 
system and comparative country cases 
5.1. Costs, competitiveness and employment disincentives 
As shown in Table 4 (section 4), the SDL is a significant levy across tax departments 
accounting for 3.27% of the total domestic revenue (including all small, medium and large 
taxpayer/employers) when SDL is set at 4.5%. Based on the tax data and the TRA Corporate 
Plan’s projections, we can calculate a basic estimate of the total SDL revenue for the 
government at different rates (Table 6) (assuming all other conditions regarding tax base 
and enforcement capacity etc. remain the same). This is a conservative assumption if we 
take into consideration the fact that since 2010 reductions in the SDL rate have not been 
followed by a reduction in total SDL revenue collected.  
Table 6: Estimates of SDL revenue at different SDL rates for mainland Tanzania (2017/18-
2021/22, billion TShs) 
SDL rate 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22 
 SDL 4.5% 329.2 389.7 461.1 527.4 616.7 
 SDL 4% 292.6 346.4 409.9 468.8 548.2 
 SDL 3.5% 256.0 303.1 358.6 410.2 479.7 
 SDL 3% 219.5 259.8 307.4 351.6 411.1 
 SDL 2.5% 182.9 216.5 256.2 293.0 342.6 
 SDL 2% 146.3 173.2 204.9 234.4 274.1 
 SDL 1.5% 109.7 129.9 153.7 175.8 205.6 
 SDL 1% 73.2 86.6 102.5 117.2 137.0 
Source: Author’s estimates based on TRA (2018) 
Table 7 presents estimates of the cost reduction that the private sector as a whole is likely to 
see as a result of different reductions in the SDL rate, again based on government estimation 
and assuming all other conditions remain the same. Given that the contribution to SDL is 
roughly equally distributed among large taxpayers and small and medium employers (Figure 
6), we can assume that the levy burden is equally distributed among all employers as well. 
These estimations are based on very strong assumptions, as they do not allow for potential 
changes in employer behaviour or the overall economy. According to our interviews with 
ATE and Cti, the Ministry of Finance seems to have generated similar projections and has 
informed stakeholders that a reduction of 0.5% of the SDL would cost the government 
around 30 billion TShs in lost revenue. Table 7 shows that more substantial reductions in the 
SDL rate could release up to 250 billion TShs into the economy (with SDL at 1%).  
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Table 7: Estimated cost reductions for employers in mainland Tanzania at different SDL 
rates (2017/18-2021/22, billion TShs) 
SDL rate  2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22 
 SDL 4.5% 0 0 0 0 0 
 SDL 4% 36.6 43.3 51.2 58.6 68.5 
 SDL 3.5% 73.2 86.6 102.5 117.2 137.0 
 SDL 3% 109.7 129.9 153.7 175.8 205.6 
 SDL 2.5% 146.3 173.2 204.9 234.4 274.1 
 SDL 2% 182.9 216.5 256.2 293.0 342.6 
 SDL 1.5% 219.5 259.8 307.4 351.6 411.1 
 SDL 1% 256.0 303.1 358.6 410.2 479.7 
Source: Author’s estimates based on TRA (2018) 
If we compare Tanzania with other African countries, Figure 11 shows total tax and 
contribution rates (%) divided by profit taxes, labour taxes and other taxes (including levies 
like SDL). The total tax and contribution rate in Tanzania is 44.1%, which is below the 
continent average of 47.1%, but above the two main regional comparators of Kenya (37.4%) 
and South Africa (28.9%). Within the East African Community (EAC), Tanzania has the highest 
total tax and contribution rate (South Sudan, 31.4%; Rwanda, 33.2%; Uganda, 33.7; Burundi, 
41.5%) and is above the world total tax and contribution rate of 40.5%. 
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Figure 11: Total tax and contribution rate (%) in Africa 
Source: PwC and World Bank (2018) 
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Several countries and relevant comparators in Africa – Kenya and South Africa – rely on a 
form of levy to finance VET and the overall education sector. These country cases have been 
used by different stakeholders in Tanzania to lobby for a reduction in the SDL rates, based on 
the underlying argument that the SDL is affecting the competitiveness of employers in 
Tanzania (see Boxes 1 and 2). 
Box 1: Kenya case study: The Industrial Training Levy 
The National Industrial Training Authority (NITA) was established under the Industrial 
Training (Amendment) Act of 2011 under the Ministry of the East African Community, 
Labour and Social Protection. NITA was initially known as the Directorate of Industrial 
Training, a Department in the Ministry of Labour. NITA’s mandate is to promote high 
standards and efficiency in industrial training and to ensure adequate supply of properly 
trained manpower at all levels in industry. The Act gives NITA the following mandates: 
 Industrial training (regulation and provision) 
 Industrial training levy administration (assess and collect) 
 Industrial training curricula 
 Integrating labour market information into skills development 
 Development and harmonisation of industrial training curricula and assessment 
guidelines 
 Assessing industrial training, testing occupational skills 
 Awarding certificates including government trade test certificates 
 Equating certificates 
 Accrediting institutions engaged in industrial training. 
NITA operates five Industrial Training Centres (ITCs): NITA-Nairobi, NITA-Textile Training 
Institute (Nairobi), NITA-Kisumu, NITA-Athi River and NITA-Mombasa. Together, the 
centres have the capacity to cater for over 5,000 trainees. In addition to these centres, 
NITA has registered/accredited more than 400 training providers and has accredited 
more than 600 assessment centres.  
The Industrial Training Act (Cap.237) makes provision for the Industrial Training Levy, 
which is intended to support in full or part the cost of industrial training incurred by 
employers. 
According to Legal Notice No. 113 of 14 June 2007, employers are required to pay a 
monthly levy of 50 Kenyan Shillings (KShs) (around US$0.50 or 1,100 TShs) to NITA per 
employee (person employed for wages/salary) including casual employees, on or before 
the last working day of the month. Registration as an employer is a legal requirement as 
per Section 5B of the Act and the Levy order. To be an employer means ‘any person, 
public body, firm, corporation or company who or which has entered into a contract of 
service to employ any person, and includes an agent, foreman, or manager’. To be an 
employee means ‘a person employed for wages or salary and includes an apprentice, 
indentured learner, temporary, seasonal and casual worker’. 
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Employers are asked to pay the levy via a direct deposit into the NITA KCB Industrial 
Area Branch Account. No cash payments are allowed, but several banking and online 
payments systems are offered (e.g. bankers cheque or mpesa bill). 
Subject to approval by NITA, employers who are up to date on levy payments can be 
reimbursed for training costs if: a) the employer makes an application to NITA two 
weeks before the training i.e. for local training and one month for overseas training; b) 
the training provider is registered with NITA and is up to date with the annual 
registration renewal; c) the employer can prove that the training is relevant to the 
duties/work of the employee(s) (cost items accepted include course fees, airfare 
(overseas), books, training materials, assesssment). The reimbursement claim must be 
supported with receipts for payment of training costs and an approval letter from NITA, 
and it is capped at 200% of an employer’s previous yearly contribution. 
In 2014 NITA has introduced an anticorruption policy and an audit and compliance 
committee charter detailing procedures and responsibilities to ensure transparency and 
accountability. However, the total levy collected directly by NITA is not reported in any 
public document, therefore it is not possible to compare the total levy burden in Kenya 
and Tanzania. Together with the governance model, the other two major differences 
are: first, the fact that the levy is not calculated as a rate of the total payroll like in 
Tanzania – instead it is a pretty low lump sum of 600 KShs. per annum per worker; 
second, the fact that employers can get a reimbursement/rebate for training expenses.  
Sources: https://www.nita.go.ke 
Box 2: South Africa case study: Skills Development Levy 
In 1994 the Government of South Africa embarked on a comprehensive reform process 
for skills development, involving legislation, structures and organisations. The aim was 
to change the cultural and institutional landscape for skills development and vocational 
training at all levels, including the introduction of a National Qualifications Framework 
(NQF). In 1998 Parliament ratified the Skills Development Act, which defined a new 
Sector Training and Education Authority (SETA) system. In 2000, 23 SETAs, each with its 
own clearly defined sector and sub-sector, were established (reduced to 21 with the 
new National Skills Development Strategy in 2011).  
SETAs are the key implementation agencies for establishing and maintaining quality in 
workplace-based training and learning. They are responsible for overseeing training and 
skills development in a specific national economic sector (including learnerships, 
internships, unit-based skills programmes and apprenticeships), and for developing 
Sector Skills Plans (SSPs) to outline the strengths and challenges of a sector in terms of 
employment and skills development. SETAs are governed by the Skills Development Act 
and Skills Development Levies Act of 1999. 
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The Skills Development Levies Act (SDLA) (No. 9 of 1999) established a compulsory levy 
scheme for the purpose of funding education and training as envisaged in the Skills 
Development Act (No. 97 of 1998). The Skills Development Levy (SDL) became payable 
with effect from 1 April 2000. The Department of Higher Education and Training,  in 
conjunction with the various SETAs, is responsible for administering the Act, while the 
South African Revenue Service (SARS) is responsible for the collection of levies. The SDL 
is intended to encourage learning and development in South Africa and is determined 
by an employer's salary bill. The SDL is 1% of the total amount paid in salaries to 
employees, including overtime payments, leave pay, bonuses, commissions and lump 
sum payments. Employers are required to pay the levy every month if they have 
registered their employees with SARS for tax purposes (Pay As You Earn (PAYE)), and if 
the employer pays over 500 000 South African Rand a year in salaries and wages to 
employees (even if they’re not registered for PAYE with SARS).  
SARS uses the funds from the SDL to develop and improve the skills of employees. The 
primary focus of the business is determined by analysing what approximately 60% of 
employees do. The levies are put in a special fund and are divided with 80% distributed 
to the different SETAs and 20% paid into the National Skills Fund.  
In accordance with the SETA Grant Regulations, SETAs pay mandatory grants to 
employers that are equivalent to 20% of the levies paid by the employer. The following 
conditions must be met: the employer must be employing 50 or more employees and 
must submit an application for a mandatory grant within six months of registration, 
supported by a Work Skills Plan (WSP) and an Annual Training Report (ATR). Mandatory 
grants are then used by employers to train their employees.  
The National Skills Fund supports skills development projects that do not fall under the 
SETAs. The fund enables the state to: drive key skills strategies; meet the training needs 
of the unemployed, non-levy-paying cooperatives, NGOs, community structures and 
vulnerable groups; promote strategic partnerships and innovation in project delivery; 
drive change towards partnership-based programmes; and contribute signiﬁcantly to 
raising the low base of education and training in south Africa. 
The SDL model in South Africa is distinctive in three main respects: 1) like in Tanzania, 
the levy is calculated as a rate over the payroll, but it is collected and retained in large 
part within the sector in which they are generated; 2) companies are guaranteed a 
mandatory grant/rebate scheme to finance training (similar to Kenya, and differently 
from Tanzania); 3) SDL is directly transferred to the relevant SETA and managed by the 
SETAs themselves. 
Source: https://www.vocational.co.za  
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In all countries considered, the skills levy acts as a disincentive on formal employment and 
tends to have a negative impact on employment rates (Dar et al., 2003). This is affected by 
several characteristics of the levy: 
 The levy is a fixed cost for the employer in the sense that it is calculated as a percentage 
of salaries paid to employees for Tanzania and South Africa and a fixed amount (50Ksh) 
in Kenya, and not as a percentage of profits or turnover. 
 The calculation of the levy: if the levy is a lump-sum transfer for each employer (this is 
the case in Kenya), then the employer can better and more flexibly manage the 
allocation of funds and will not be discouraged from increasing salaries (this is potentially 
the case in Tanzania and South Africa where the levy is proportional to the payroll); 
 The rate of the levy: high rates (the SDL rate in Tanzania is by far the highest among the 
three countries considered) are a disincentive for formal employment, especially in 
sectors prone to fluctuations amongst seasonal workers. 
 The frequency of the payment: the levy has to be paid monthly (in all country cases, even 
in Kenya where the levy is a fixed lump sum per employee), thus it can create problems 
for employers in terms of frequent payments and potential interest rates on delayed 
payments.  
5.2. Trust, accountability and governance 
Over recent decades in Tanzania the relationship between the public and private sector has 
been characterised by mistrust. This has happened despite the fact that the dominant 
political party has strengthened links with major private-sector domestic players, employers 
and representative organisations such as TPSF and ATE in policy-making. In the current 
political settlement, mistrust and unpredictability have been recognised as major 
impediments for private-sector investment and have manifested in major tensions 
(Andreoni, 2017a).  
Since the introduction of the SDL, and increasingly during the last decade, the SDL has 
become a major source of these tensions. On several occasions the private sector has 
denounced the lack of transparency in the collection and allocation of the SDL, and there 
have been allegations of corruption or misallocation of the SDL for funding political 
campaigns. On the other hand, the government has historically experienced significant 
challenges in collecting taxes from large and medium size employers and has witnessed 
limited tax compliance.  
Figure 12 shows how Tanzania has remained far below Kenya in terms of tax revenue as a 
percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) since early 2000, and is pretty much at the 
bottom if compared with other EAC countries. The government has thus always assumed 
that the private sector’s complaints around the SDL (and other taxes and levies) are largely 
ungrounded.  
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Figure 12: Tax revenue collection in Tanzania, composition and comparators 
 
Source: Andreoni (2017a) based on Tanzanian authorities and IMF staff calculations, 2017.  
Indeed, the fact that private-sector representative organisations such as ATE have been 
unable to a) challenge the government with hard evidence on the total amount of SDL 
collected from employers (despite the fact that data would be available as employers report 
them to the TRA directly and that TRA data are published online) and b) call the government 
to account for the funds allocated to VETA (despite the fact that ATE and other private-
sector organisations sit on the VETA Boards and have access to financial statements) 
suggests that many employers are concerned that they will expose their own indiscretions in 
the process.  
Since mid- and late 2000, companies and their representative bodies – ATE, TPSF, Cti and the 
CEO Roundtable – have expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the SDL is not used for 
vocational training only and that employers have been – according to them – double taxed. 
This claim stems from three main facts. First, the SDL is not ring-fenced and tends to 
disappear in the Education Fund where it complements (and is potentially a substitute for) 
other central budget allocations for education. Second, companies have to pay additional 
costs if they want to access more focused SCs for training, upgrading and/or retraining their 
existing workers. This is partially the result of the way in which the VETA system has evolved, 
where SCs are more readily available and rely on the same infrastructure as LCs. Finally, 
employers perceive that VETA graduates are often not ready to work and that the amount of 
on-the-job training they have to do (and fund) to compensate for this lack of readiness is 
another additional cost to employers. Companies’ expectations seem to be slightly 
misplaced in this respect, as there seems to be widespread lack of awareness of the fact that 
in all countries companies/employers face this challenge and have to provide on-the-job 
training. Unfortunately, there has been no attempt so far in estimating the extra on-the-job 
training that companies have to provide in different sectors in Africa (this is available in 
more advanced countries only). 
With respect to the accountability of the overall SDL financing and allocation model, the 
private sector has mainly raised general concerns around the absence of an efficient and 
effective mechanism to properly monitor utilisation of the SDL. As discussed in section 4, the 
VETA system presents a number of accountability issues, especially with respect to its zone-
level activities and internal revenue activities. The involvement of private-sector companies 
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and organisations in representative bodies and committees at central and zonal levels seems 
to mainly focus on curriculum reform than external auditing of finance and training 
activities. This lack of accountability is made even more severe by the fact that students 
enrolled in VETA training lack any voice. Differently from NACTE, the VETA system does not 
have a procedure to capture the opinions of students and their potential complaints with 
respect to the quality of training they receive and the various internship/apprenticeship 
arrangements. 
Finally, the overall governance model around the SDL and technical and vocational 
education and training (TVET) system has been questioned on several occasions by both 
private and public players. Three main issues have been raised. First, issues have been raised 
around the fact that VETA is under the umbrella of the Ministry of Education, while the 
mandate to engage with the private sector on TVET matters is under the Ministry of Labour. 
This misalignment in terms of mandate and functions has pushed several players to 
recommend the relocation of VETA under its original ministerial umbrella. The second issue 
is that VETA is both a sector regulator and a VET provider. Although this is not uncommon 
(see also the Kenya case), it has been suggested that this governance model might affect 
VETA’s overall capacity to exercise both functions effectively and impartially. Finally, the 
TVET system in Tanzania operates as a dual system, with NACTE regulating ‘technical 
education’ and VETA regulating (and providing) ‘vocational training’. The rationale behind 
the maintenance of this dual system is that technical education has a higher 
theoretical/foundational focus, while vocational training is more focused on the 
development of applied/narrower skills sets. In reality, given the challenges discussed above, 
VETA is struggling to provide applied and industry-specific skills. 
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6. Conclusion: re-aligning incentives 
and designing for differences 
In the FYDP 2016/17-2020/21, the Government of Tanzania has committed significant 
resources (around 350 billion TShs per year, see Table 8) for skills development and has 
proposed a number of strategic actions to improve the sector. Despite this commitment, it is 
unclear how these resources will be mobilised and allocated. 
Table 8: Five-Year Development Plan total costings (billion TShs) 
 
Source: Government of Tanzania (2016a, FYDP Annex). 
In line with the new National Skills Development Strategy 2016/17-2025/26 (NSDS) 
(Government of Tanzania, 2016b) promoted jointly by the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology and the Prime Minister’s Office for Labour, Youth, Employment and Persons with 
Disabilities, the government has promoted the following general and specific initiatives in 
the FYDP: 
a. Skills Development Fund 
‘Government has resolved to earmark the funds so generated to skills development in the 
country. The portion of the funds, which goes to support higher education, will be reviewed 
in tandem with reforms to making the Higher Education Student Loan Board (HESLB) run on 
loan recovery with some modest interest rate. Studies in other countries show that private 
returns to higher education are higher enough to enable graduates service the education 
loan on semi-commercial basis.’ 
 SUBSECTOR  GOVT.  PRIVATE  DPs  Total  2016/17  2017/18 2018/19 100 19/20  2020/21 
 Manufacturing     2,339.12      20,991.93       554.01     24,256.26 416.439 5736.544 5854.75 5672.554 5429.824
 Mining       104.04        3,912.30  -                    4,016.34 808.97 980 980 980 979
 Construction          94.44             50.00         50.00          194.44 22.44 70 52 50 0
 Agricultural     2,989.71        3,937.58    2,909.43       9,101.86 2716.671 2314.986 2298.356 2294.446 2281.296
 Environmental and Natural Resources          50.00  -                       133.74          183.66 38.12 37.62 37.93 35.24 34.635
 Tourism        553.82        2,953.00         52.68       3,559.50 711.659 714.589 711.86 711.2 710.02
 Science Technology and Innovation        102.50           162.00       137.00          428.00 85.6 85.6 85.6 85.6 85.6
 Education     4,498.92             19.66       448.61       4,967.19 992.94 992.94 994.03 993.6 993.62
 Creative industry       344.86  -                  -                       344.86 0 80.75 80.99 81.03 81.04
 Skills development     1,073.00  -                       635.54       1,708.54 350.588 351.588 351.588 351.588 353.188
 Healthy     6,997.36  -                    1,011.00       8,008.36 1606.166 1601.81 1599.81 1599.31 1600.8153
 Water sub sector     2,477.10  -                    3,517.59 5994.649 1198.98 1,199.00 1199.528 1199.141 1198
 Urban Planning, Housing and Human 
Settlement  
   3,621.96  -                  -                    3,621.96 724 724.30 725.09 724.29 724
 Food and nutrition       254.54             23.31       407.80          685.65 161.88 161.88 161.98 162.88 161.68
 Poverty Reduction and Social protection       493.40  -                       404.69          899.09 179.802 179.802 679.802 679.802 675.802
 Good Governance     2,095.93  -                         70.81       2,166.74 433.232 433.232 433.232 433.808 433.232
infrastructure  24,651.69      12,503.61       361.61     37,516.92 7129.0555 9,502.85 7668.10273 5732.457 3392.257
 TOTAL  52,742.39      44,553.39  10,694.51   107,654.01   17,576.54    25,167.49  23,914.65   21,786.95    19,134.01 
Skilling Tanzania: improving financing, governance and outputs of the skills development sector 
47 
b. Reforms for specific flagship projects 
‘In respect to mass training for development of rare and specialized skills, particularly those 
that are key for the envisaged industrialisation process, the following will be critical: 
(a) Increasingly allocating revenue generated from the skills development levy (SDL) to skills 
development, particularly for skills required in priority industries; 
(b) Establishing a mechanism that will allow the private sector to participate in determining 
their demand for skills and quantities as well as in shaping the requisite interventions for 
effective and efficient provision of technical education and vocation training; 
(c) Having clear strategies for availing scholarships and other support for higher education 
and rare skills related to priority areas and industries; 
(d) Behind successful training in specialized skills is quality education at primary and 
secondary levels gradual review of school administrations at preprimary trough to 
secondary levels is envisaged in order to ensure quality management and delivery of 
education services. For, a piloting of public school administrations based on professional 
management approach, where school managers are granted power to oversee staff 
incentives and general behaviour is proposed.’ 
The NSDS is articulated around five pillars, and includes apprenticeships, entrepreneurship, 
vocational and technical education and training, university education, and post-employment 
upgrading of skills: 
1 An effective national co-ordination mechanism among institutions and the private sector 
to drive skills development.   
2 Increased equitable access to skills for all and at all levels including compulsory 
internship programmes.   
3 Increased relevance and quality of skills for employability and self-employment.  
4 Inclusive and sustainable financing mechanisms incorporating PPPs.  
5 A results-based implementation framework. 
Implementation of this strategy will follow a sectoral approach where skills analysis and 
interventions will be based on the requirement of each targeted sector (see Ministry of 
Education and Vocational Training, 2015a-c and 2016 for skills gaps studies for the tourism, 
agribusiness, construction and transport industries). In order for each sector to effectively 
identify and address its skills shortage, each sector will be required to establish a lean and 
private-sector led Sectoral Skills Council. The Sectoral Skills Council will be responsible for 
carrying out skills analysis and to support the implementation of interventions to address 
skills challenges in the sector. The Councils will report to the National Skills Development 
Technical Committee (NSDTC) for guidance and support, under the leadership of the Chief 
Secretary (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13: Governance and coordination of the National Skills Development Council  
 
Source: Government of Tanzania (2016b) 
While some of these initiatives point in the right direction, implementation and enforcement 
of many of these measures is still in progress. As already documented in sections 3 and 4, in 
reality, the overall skills development system in Tanzania has transformed along two main 
axes, which reflect the overall political settlement dynamics in the country since 1995 
(Andreoni, 2017a).  
From a uniform national system and process originally conceived in the mid-1990s, the VETA 
system has evolved into multiple concurrent sub-systems and processes over the last two 
decades. The relative independence (and limited accountability) of Zonal Boards and VETA 
centres, a proliferation of income-generating activities and the expansion (and subsequent 
reduction and regulation) in the number of private VET providers are all manifestations of a 
fragmented political settlement in which resources and rents (also in the form of regulatory 
power) are captured by both public and private actors along different (and interconnected) 
clientelist networks.  
Opportunities for resource and rent capture are evident at all levels of the system and are 
not limited to the financing model. In some cases, the process of decentralisation has also 
created incentives for innovation in VET training delivery – e.g. the introduction of SCs – and 
has opened up space for the emergence of ‘pockets of excellence’ as demonstrated by the 
IMTT experience in the mining sector (see section 3.2). Within the decentralised system – 
and with reference to a specific sectoral issue i.e. mining skills – the mistrust between 
central government and the private sector has partially dissipated and, as a result, a new 
space has opened up for effective PPP with full involvement of a VETA centre, business 
association and private companies. 
In line with overall government action since 2015, recent reforms have attempted to reduce 
rent capture through a process of re-centralisation of the SDL and a more centralised 
governance model. These changes are in response to two aspects: i) the need for better 
coordination and reduction in rent capture at the lower levels of the system (and internal 
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party factions controlling boards and committees that allocate resources in the system); and 
ii) major infrastructural investments having pushed the government into taking direct 
control over important domestic revenues like the SDL and potentially using them within a 
centralised budget system.  
As a result of this (re)centralisation process, however, the relationship between the SDL and 
skills training has been weakened. Independently from the fact that the SDL transfer to VETA 
has remained basically constant over the years, the stricter control exercised by the Ministry 
of Finance over the collection and allocation of taxes/levies has reinforced the feeling that 
the SDL is not delivering in terms of skills development in the country. This lack of trust 
towards the government has also pushed the private sector to lobby for a reduction in the 
levy rather than focusing on how to optimise the value added from the existing levy. 
In order to ensure more constructive engagement between the public and private sector, 
the transparency and accountability of the fund flows seem to be an important preliminary 
condition. This implies:  
 a gradual move away from a centralised system where the SDL is used to fund general 
government expenditures 
 a less ambiguous legal framework which allows tracking of SDL collection and allocation 
 a more direct link between sectoral-level collection and allocation, while guaranteeing 
that cross-sectoral needs are met (along the lines of the South Africa model discussed 
previously)  
 increased voice and accountability in the curriculum and determination of whether 
existing training models are fit for purpose.  
Reform opportunities also exist in terms of restructuring incentives to take into account 
differences across sectors and firm types, as well as different governance levels.  
Given the current governance structure and funding allocation mechanisms, the level at 
which the incentives are introduced might affect the outcome. For example, at the zonal 
level, new ways to align the interests of the VET in the region with existing employers could 
result in greater employability and accountability. 
The SDL itself could also be reformed. The Kenyan model suggests that using a lump-sum 
contribution per employer could be beneficial, instead of a rate calculated on total 
employer’s payroll. Other options include to remain with a rate system, but to change the 
levy base from the payroll to total turnover to take into account differences in firm size. 
Finally, the threshold of four employees could be elevated to nine, which is the conventional 
definition of a small enterprise in Tanzania (Andreoni, 2017b). These changes might be key in 
reducing SDL-related disincentives to employment, especially among small and medium 
enterprises. Additionally, these changes might not necessarily result in dramatic reductions 
in the total SDL revenue. 
Another important area for reform relates to the design and delivery of skills training itself. 
There is a significant need for greater differentiation between skills training to meet the 
Skilling Tanzania: improving financing, governance and outputs of the skills development sector 
50 
needs of current employers, and skills training to enable trainees to establish new economic 
activity (i.e. self-employment). For existing employers, the establishment of a closer link 
between training and business needs – in line with the model adopted in the mining (and 
partially hotel) industry – is an encouraging option. Moreover, building on the spontaneous 
emergence of SCs, especially among VETA centres, incentives could be introduced to 
overcome remaining resistances to change in VETA. For example, a number of LCs might be 
shortened, and an increasing number of existing demand-driven SCs could be funded 
directly by the SDL. This would increase the perception of added value from the SDL 
amongst companies, and in some cases could also result in a reduction in the overall costs 
faced by employers to train their workforce. 
Finally, promoting the involvement of the private sector in on-the-job training through 
industrial placements, dual apprenticeships and internships is critical to improve the overall 
supply of quality VET and a skilled workforce. The introduction of rebate or grant models 
such as those adopted in South Africa and Kenya could potentially improve the link between 
VETA and VET providers and private companies. Joint effort in this direction also seems an 
important step in reducing overall mistrust between the private and public sector, and 
making the involvement of representative organisations in the governance system more 
meaningful. 
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